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[Vikarion]

That's not my position at all. I said you don't need empirical (in the sense of scientific) evidence for all kinds of beliefs to be accepted as reliable. For scientific theories, e.g., you do need empirical (intersubjectively checkable and checked: peer reviewed, observable) evidence to consider it reliable. In other academic fields, like the humanities observability does not take such a precedence, for example. mathematics, e.g., is largely non-empirical. Yet, mathmatical knowledge usually exeeeds the knowledge of empirical sciences by far in reliability!

I didn't say that Science is based in Faith, either. What I said is that if you want to justify science, you can't do so with science. You need a metaphysical fundament, that is non-scientific, to justify science as a process. One can do so, quite reasonably.

IF you stand by the position that all kinds of explanations and justifications need to be scientific, THEN you have the problem where you are in a situation where the cat races after it's tail. You can't justify the principles you want to justify by themselves. The poition defeats itself, unless you commit to some fundamentalism, where science doesn't need justification, but is to be accepted without justification.

Here's a definition of empirical: "based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic."

Here's a definition of science: "systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation."

Your definition of science and empiricism is not that which, apparently, other share.

How do we know that math is a way to know things? Because we observe that it works, and we establish mathematical principles from those observations that allow us to extrapolate. It took work for the human species to figure out those principles, they didn't come down to us in full form. They had to be discovered.

Now, what we do know is that science works. We don't know that "other ways of knowing work". So when we want to know if those "other ways of knowing" work, then our only recourse is to compare them to what we do know works.

[Saede Riordan]

Just grabbing this bit here Vik, because a really super easy way to prove this point is to demonstrate to the person that they already are an atheist. They already don't believe in every other god save for their own. Its their own specific religion that they are blinded to the faults of.

Uh... nuh. Not at all flying. If I'm a theist, I'm believing in a divine person, simply speaking. What you're talking about is another kategory than the existence of divine persons: It's the question of what form the divine person(s) take: Are they one or many or a few or...

So, you're makeing a category mistake in positing that the question which form divinity takes has a bearing on the question whether divinity exists.

the question of whether 'divinity' exists is completely unbounded, you have to define what that divinity is in order to determine if it exists or not, else it is completely unfalsifiable. Or, to put it another way, if your observations of the universe are the same regardless of the answer, then you know nothing.

That's not my position at all. I said you don't need empirical (in the sense of scientific) evidence for all kinds of beliefs to be accepted as reliable. For scientific theories, e.g., you do need empirical (intersubjectively checkable and checked: peer reviewed, observable) evidence to consider it reliable. In other academic fields, like the humanities observability does not take such a precedence, for example. mathematics, e.g., is largely non-empirical. Yet, mathmatical knowledge usually exeeeds the knowledge of empirical sciences by far in reliability!

The best way to respond with this is to start with a question, why do you believe what you believe, and what does it mean in your schema for a belief to be reliable?

I'm stepping outside hard sciences here, I'm not referring to what it means for something to be a scientific theory, or that it be peer checked, simply, why do you believe what you believe? And what leads you to determine that your beliefs accurately map onto reality?

Surely, you would want your map to match the territory as closely as possible, so that you don't do something foolish like jump off a cliff because you believe you can fly.

The scientific method has thus far, produced by far the most accurate map of the territory, and using it we've been able to make incredibly accurate predictions about future events, and develop incredibly advanced tools. Thus if your goal is to create a model of reality that most closely corresponds with that reality, the scientific method is a rather good way of going about figuring out that model.

This is outside of classrooms, your brain does this naturally to a degree, you know if you kick a ball that it will behave in a certain way, but how, do you know that? Why do you believe what you believe?

This brings us down to the long quote in my previous post, which you really ought read.

I didn't say that Science is based in Faith, either. What I said is that if you want to justify science, you can't do so with science. You need a metaphysical fundament, that is non-scientific, to justify science as a process. One can do so, quite reasonably.

IF you stand by the position that all kinds of explanations and justifications need to be scientific, THEN you have the problem where you are in a situation where the cat races after it's tail. You can't justify the principles you want to justify by themselves. The position defeats itself, unless you commit to some fundamentalism, where science doesn't need justification, but is to be accepted without justification.

If you're really not willing to read the entire bit I quoted before, then here is an attempt to tl;dr

Here's how I treat this problem myself:  I try to approach questions like "Should I trust my brain?" or "Should I trust Occam's Razor?" as though they were nothing special— or at least, nothing special as deep questions go.

Should I trust Occam's Razor?  Well, how well does (any particular version of) Occam's Razor seem to work in practice?  What kind of probability-theoretic justifications can I find for it?  When I look at the universe, does it seem like the kind of universe in which Occam's Razor would work well?

Should I trust my brain?  Obviously not; it doesn't always work.  But nonetheless, the human brain seems much more powerful than the most sophisticated computer programs I could consider trusting otherwise.  How well does my brain work in practice, on which sorts of problems?

When I examine the causal history of my brain—its origins in natural selection—I find, on the one hand, all sorts of specific reasons for doubt; my brain was optimized to run on the ancestral savanna, not to do math.  But on the other hand, it's also clear why, loosely speaking, it's possible that the brain really could work.  Natural selection would have quickly eliminated brains so completely unsuited to reasoning, so anti-helpful, as anti-Occamian or anti-Laplacian priors.

So what I did in practice, does not amount to declaring a sudden halt to questioning and justification.  I'm not halting the chain of examination at the point that I encounter Occam's Razor, or my brain, or some other unquestionable.  The chain of examination continues—but it continues, unavoidably, using my current brain and my current grasp on reasoning techniques.  What else could I possibly use?

Indeed, no matter what I did with this dilemma, it would be me doing it.  Even if I trusted something else, like some computer program, it would be my own decision to trust it.

The technique of rejecting beliefs that have absolutely no justification, is in general an extremely important one.  I sometimes say that the fundamental question of rationality is "Why do you believe what you believe?"  I don't even want to say something that sounds like it might allow a single exception to the rule that everything needs justification.

Which is, itself, a dangerous sort of motivation; you can't always avoid everything that might be risky, and when someone annoys you by saying something silly, you can't reverse that stupidity to arrive at intelligence.

But I would nonetheless emphasize the difference between saying:

"Here is this assumption I cannot justify, which must be simply taken, and not further examined."

Versus saying:

"Here the inquiry continues to examine this assumption, with the full force of my present intelligence—as opposed to the full force of something else, like a random number generator or a magic 8-ball—even though my present intelligence happens to be founded on this assumption."

[Nicoletta Mithra]

Vikarion, just some gems for your consideration:

"I'm coming from the fact that no other way of knowing things seems to produce results that correspond with reality, or even be internally coherent."

That's hardly a fact at all.

"You want to assert that I have to first adapt some sort of view to justify science. No, I don't. Science just works."

No, I say if (you know the meaning of 'if', do you?) you want to justify science, you can't do so by science. Obviously, you opt for fundamentalism. "Science just works." It's sink or swim.

The defintion you give for science does implicitly include peer-review, by the way. Just because it doesn't note so explicity doesn't mean it's not part of it. Also scientific observation is different in mayn ways from everyday observation. It is theory-laden and oftentimes quite indirect and is inextricably linked to experiment.

Also, even if scientific experimentation/observation is not that different from everyday observation, it sill doesn't alone suffice for having something taken as justified as knowledge by the scientific community: There needs to be review to have it accepted as such. Observation does not equal justification, in science: The observation needs to be repeatable independently from the original observer.

You seem quite naive when it comes to science and what it is. It's obvious you are not more than remotely acknowledged with theory of science. Well, if you follow a naive idea of what science is, and go with your unreflected epistemology, then one might see not how there's a big difference between scientific experimentation and everyday observation.

That's a rather uncritical thing to do so. But sure, feel free to!

"Could there be other ways of knowing? Certainly. But in order to show that there are, you need to have a means of showing that they actually exist."

The hallmark of fundamentalism: You Say that "Science just works." and you don't need to justify it. Yet, other ways of knowing have to be justified? You are "perfectly entitled to notice that it (science) works, and thus adapt the view", while others are not entitlked as perfectly to notice that a religious worldview works for them and to adapt it? You really have no better reasons there than the religious fundamentalist.

And of course you have the same claim to having the superior turth as if there should be other ways of knowing, they have to be proved: Of course on your terms.

Sheesh. There's no sense in discussing this. Just be happy with your worldview, you're not willing to change it anyway.

Theologians, archaeologists, philosophers are of course peer-reviewed. I'm quite sure, though, that they didn't come to the 'scientific' conclusion that God doesn't exist. That's most certainly a private conclusion you personally came to. Not every scientist is a Dawkins. In fact most aren't. Just see what Higgs had to say on the compatibility of science and religion and what he thinks about Dawkins.

(By the way, Newton had his laws peer-reviewed. Before the rise of jounrals they had letters circulating in the scientific cummunity for this. peer review doesn't necessarily imply publication in a journal. Shocking, I know! There's even a movement in the scientific community that is against journals and advocates for a more open, communal peer review through internet resources.)

The problem you have with religious texts is that you assume them to speak about empirical truths. Well, they don't. it's interesting that you put so much worth on the literal meaning of Scripture - when you are so fast to defend Hitchens by saying he usues analogies. Why is Hitchens allowed to use those, when the Bible can't use analogy and metaphor?

So, congratulation. You noticed that the bible doesn't give a litterally accurate account of historical events. Well, newsflash: That was something Augustine pointed out already around 400 CE. Scholars of the Torah found out that the authors and editors of the text never meant it to be read litterally (at least not exclusively and certain parts most certainly not at all) but rather with an understanding that it was filled with allegories and metaphorical meaning.

They quite probably even built in literal contradictions in the text as a means to make clear that the reader is not to understand the text literally at all. So, you seem to ignore the tradition in which and the intention with which the text was written. Not the best practice in the study of literature.

So, the logical fallacy you commited is that after finding out that the holy books don't speak the truth in some matters, they don't tell truth in all matters. 'Some' is logically subaltern to 'all', though - not the other way around.

[Rhiannon]

Relevant to OP (though not the theism/antitheism discussion)

[Vikarion]

Mithra,

I'm not trying to say that science is right just because science is right. I'm trying to say that, when we use science, it seems to be a reliable way of gaining knowledge about the world. It seems to be reliable in part because it works. Now, because I'm observing that it works, does that mean it is self-justifying? Well, sorta. I can't stop observing, I don't think anyone can.

Are you trying to argue that science does not work? If not, if you agree that science produces predictions that are fulfilled, machines that work, then I would say that science is, in the sense of probability, self-proving. Do we really know that science works? Well, if we don't, the level at which we have placed the bar for "knowing" is too high for anything to reach.

I won't comment on your ad hominems, but I will say this: do I think that the scientific process involves peer review, debate, experiment? Yes. Is that all science is? No, that is advanced methodology for being more certain of conclusions. But when Galileo decided to drop weights to see if they fell at the same rate, that was also science, his observations were science, the doing of science.

When I say "works", however, I do not mean that science works for me. Scientific advances and predictions work for everyone. We seem to be sharing a common reality in which, for example, atomic theory works for everyone, and thus, your computer works.

But other ways of knowing, or at least some other ways of knowing, don't seem to have that universality or real-world compatibility. I think it should be obvious that, for example, Islam and Hinduism cannot both be true. How do you know if they are true?

A thought experiment: suppose Christianity could be shown to be false in every supernatural claim, by evidence. Would it still be a valid way of knowing? A way of knowing what? That's the point I was making about whether something actually happened, such as Moses and the Exodus. I didn't lose my faith because I found out Genesis wasn't literal or that the earth is old.

It is entirely possible to muddy the waters and create justifications for believing things. But what I'm interested in is knowing if what I believe is really true. I prefer to know what actually happened in the past, and what is actually possible in the future. Now, I already have one system - one way of knowing - which I know, as much as it is possible to know anything, works. Not just for me, but for everyone. Not perfectly, but very well. Given that it does work for everyone, in the sense of giving us a good map of reality, I think that it is reasonable to adapt it.

Now, suppose I am presented with other "ways of knowing". How do I know that they are truthful, that they are real? Suppose I was a Heaven's Gate cult member - am I really going to go to a spaceship in the sky if I commit suicide? Shouldn't I be worried about whether this way of knowing is true? Not just "true for me", but actually something that corresponds to reality? There's a lot riding on that.

The only way I see to validate "ways of knowing" as truth or not is to compare them with the one that seems true already. Yes, I observed that science produces results, but observation is all we have. We have to start somewhere.

[Nicoletta Mithra]

the question of whether 'divinity' exists is completely unbounded, you have to define what that divinity is in order to determine if it exists or not, else it is completely unfalsifiable. Or, to put it another way, if your observations of the universe are the same regardless of the answer, then you know nothing.

Well, a lot of statements are per se unfalsifiable. Even in science, most statements are only falsifiable on the background of statements that are accepted as true. It's called confirmation holism.

So, a claim or statement might be unfalsifiable, but you still might have good reason to accept it, given the alternatives.

The best way to respond with this is to start with a question, why do you believe what you believe, and what does it mean in your schema for a belief to be reliable?

I'm stepping outside hard sciences here, I'm not referring to what it means for something to be a scientific theory, or that it be peer checked, simply, why do you believe what you believe? And what leads you to determine that your beliefs accurately map onto reality?

Honestly, I think most people don't really know this. And I also think that those that do, don't grasp how profound this question is - they are either uncritical, naive or both - for the most part.

That said, there are some minimal requirements, I think:

First, I believe that it is a good starting point to check the belief on the background of the other beliefs: For a belief to be justifiably held, it needs to form a coherent system of beliefs with other beliefs. To be coherent the system needs necessarily be consistent, of course, as consitency is implied by coherence.

I would put more weight on consistency of course, as it is the precondition to coherence. Yet, the more coherent a system of beliefs is, while accomodating a greater number of beliefs, the better.

There are of course other factors that play a role, and many of those are 'empirical' in a rather broad sense in that they are experiential. That would include 'scientific evidence' but also other factors like 'introspection' or such.

Then there are non-'empirical' factors, I'd say: Properly understanding the definition of 'square' has nothing to do with experience, I'd say. (While I'm sure others may disagree.)

For counting a belief as reliable, it should be, at least, justified.

The "mapping problem" is then dependent on what kind of reality you try to 'map'. Modern natural science has a very specific idea about what it wants to achieve, it enters, so to speak, with an idea about the reality - or part of reality - it wants to examine into the game of map-making. It has been quite successful in achieving this and I admire science for this. But that doesn't mean, logically, that you can't go out with the aim to make other maps of other parts of reality.

If I want to look at the the reality of ethics, I might limit myself if I use the same critera there. There is no easy way to empirically measure 'good' or 'evil', 'right' or 'wrong'. To give an example, the methods of questioning, debate, argument as used by philosophical ethics are - in my opinion - more suited to that piece of reality than methods that are reduced to counting 'what people hold to be good' or 'what people hold to be evil; right or wrong'.

To stay in the metaphor of the map: If you go out on ground to map the northern european lowlands, you will have to use other cartographic methods than when mapping the andean mountains. In one case you can reasonable assume to work on the surface of a spheroid - in the other case you can't. In one case you might want to prepare by getting a bike or a car - in the other you might miss important parts if you limit yourself to the parts that are reachable on wheels.

Also, while in the case of the geographical map, basically the methods of measuring the structure of the landscape might apply all the same, it is quite unclear - and to be honest I think rather absurd - to think that the methods of natural science (which have been decided on and eveloped to give no regard to things as 'good' and 'evil') are a good fit for the study of ethics.

[/quote]The scientific method has thus far, produced by far the most accurate map of the territory, and using it we've been able to make incredibly accurate predictions about future events, and develop incredibly advanced tools. Thus if your goal is to create a model of reality that most closely corresponds with that reality, the scientific method is a rather good way of going about figuring out that model.[/quote]

This, as I already intimated above, is a question of what you take reality to be. In my opinion, Science is hughely successful in 'mapping' the part of reality it sets out to map. And don't get me wrong: That is a great thing! I'm all for science and using the scientific approach on those parts of reality that it aims to explore.

But to assume that because science is so successfull in producing reliable belief, that all reliable belief must be scientific is a fallacy. It just doesn't follow.

On the one hand it obstructs the view on the fact that we have a lot of reliable beliefs - tested in and by millions of years prior to the rise of modern science and merely confirmed by the latter - that we would have - rightfully so - without modern science.
This brings us down to the long quote in my previous post, which you really ought read.

On the other hand it obstructs the view on the fact that (natural) science was in fact developed to not give an account of the entirety of reality, but only of the natural aspects of it. The humanities have made progess as well, if not as spectacular as the sciences. Does that mean that science is better to examine the phenomena which the humanities set out to explore? I highly doubt it, to put it mildly.

If you're really not willing to read the entire bit I quoted before, then here is an attempt to tl;dr

Actually, I read the entire bit. I am rather sympathetic to the ideal of going on to question. I'm no stranger to that, I'd say. That's why I insisted that I don't think that you need 'faith' in science, even though you need to go beyond science in my opinion: There are other capacities of reason which allow us to look for justifications of science without necessarily becoming religious (though religious thought might be suitable to justify science, maybe). 
It's also that I'm really not holding the belief that one doesn't need evidence for a belief to be reliable: I'm thinking it depends on what 'part of reality' the belief tries to 'map to' whether you need scientific, empirical evidence.
So, while largely agreeing with what you have as last part, there, I felt it important to point out that I'm neither saying 'you need (religious) faith to justify science' nor that I say 'scientifc evidence is useless'.

[Louella Dougans]

I don't see the point in a thread where people are simply quoting other people's opinions at each other.

[Nicoletta Mithra]

Vikarion,

I'm not at all trying to say that science does not work. Of course it does. And I'm personally all for science. It works astonishingly well for the part of reality it aims to examine and explain in a way that allows for reliable reproduction of events.

I would even go so far to say that of all forms of producing knowledge and of knowing, science has, arguable, the best and most exclusive access to that part of reality.

What I'm opposed to is the idea that science has a priveleged and exclusive access to all of reality and that it is what we should use to measure all other forms of knowledge and getting to know.

Let me give an example: There is a guy who is your best friend. It just clicked with the two of you waaay back in the sandbox and since you have been bffs. This is about personal relations, obviously, and not, strictly speaking laws of nature. It's a singular, contingent, historical event. It's something science doesn't really aim to explain: And while it might be true that science could one day give a full causal explanation (that's the business of science to a large degree) of this friendship, I think that at the moment the best explanation is one that referrs to emotions, intentions and character of the two of you - which all are not readily translateble to brain states, hormone levels and such. At least not yet.

So the latter kind of explanation, which one might call a 'personal explanation' seem much more appropriate for explaining a singular, contingent, historical event than the explanations of science which aim and generality and repeatability. And I don't think that the fact that getting friends with your friend didn't work out equally for everyone else makes that friendship less real. Nor is the personal explanation any less good or matches reality less: Rather, by giveng reasons why it is not a repeatable event it matches reality more closely than some description of barin states, hormones and the like that is, theoretically, repeatable.

I think that what religion aims at with it's analogies and metaphors is similarly a personal relationship, rather than historical truth and also an isntruction how everyone, earnestly looking out for it, can enter into such a relation.
That of course doesn't make it true that there is a being or a number of beings with which you can enter into a relation with. Yet, I think it says you shouldn't examine religion like it's aiming to talk about laws of nature or historical truths. And thus, one should examine it not with the tools that are suited to the latter two.

[Nicoletta Mithra]

I don't see the point in a thread where people are simply quoting other people's opinions at each other.

The point is called 'exchange of opinions'.
Maybe also 'reaching understanding'.

[Vikarion]

Mithra,

I think part of this is a misunderstanding. For example, in your friend analogy, I would never say that it is only accurate to describe things in scientific terms. I mean, there goes art, literature...ouch.

What I am referring to is the primacy of science as a means to test other beliefs. Suppose, taking your example, that I use my experience to claim that human friendship has nothing to do with chemicals in the brain. My argument is that such a statement should be not be given credence, given what we know by science about the brain.

Now, if you want to argue that one can have or hold beliefs that are not strictly scientifically proven, and know things by them, well, quite possibly. I mean, if that's religion, well, I hold some tenets of Buddhist philosophy. Can I scientifically prove them? Not currently. Do they work for me? Yes. But they also don't contradict science.

I don't know what country you come from. I live in America. And I can tell you, the majority of Christians here are not taking the Bible as allegorical, personal advice. No, they think the things in it actually happened, and not only do they want to enforce its rules on others, they are pretty insistent on claiming that every other belief system is evil.

So, if you want to say that beliefs which do not contradict science are valid, or at least some of them are, well, that's a ripe area for discussion. But it's another thing entirely for me to agree that the young-earth creationist has as valid a viewpoint as the geologist. If you aren't saying that, then cool.

The other point I would make is that I find belief in supernatural entities to be somewhat in the vein of things which contradict science. Given what we know about reality, supernatural existence or interference seems exceedingly unlikely, and it seems highly likely that experiences of the supernatural exist only in the brain, especially given that we can now induce some of them at will.

I think that our willingness to believe a proposition should be proportionate to its agreement with science.

[Louella Dougans]

I don't see the point in a thread where people are simply quoting other people's opinions at each other.

The point is called 'exchange of opinions'.
Maybe also 'reaching understanding'.

well, it's like:

Person A: I think this
Person B: No, that is wrong because Some Dude wrote Some Thing that I'm quoting from.

But what does person B really think, for themselves, about the subject ?

I don't see the point in reading what Some Dude thinks about the subject, cos I can do that on Some Dude's website, rather than here.

but whatever.

[ValentinaDLM]

Relevant to OP (though not the theism/antitheism discussion)

My thoughts exactly, a few people have told me I am bad for boycotting chick-fil-a over the things the owner says and does, but as much as he has the right to speak I have the right to exercise consequences for that speech including not spending money where profits might be spend in ways that negatively effect LGBT people like myself.

[Saede Riordan]

Okay, question then for you Nico? Where do you draw the line between where reality stops and where beliefs and ideas begin?

You say that something like the scientific method is ill suited to the discussion of something like ethics, but I disagree, using the scientific method we can make all sorts of tests and predictions and experiments that determine how people respond to certain stimuli and such.

Can science tell us what is right and wrong? No, because those are subjective human ideas, we created them, so we get to decide what they mean. That said, once we've decided what they mean, we can use science to determine if something falls into one category or another. Science is useful for building the map of reality, in fact, I would argue there is no better way to map reality, because any other way to map reality fails to take that reality into account when making the map.

Suppose you write on a sheet of paper:  "(1) Everything on this sheet of paper is true, (2) The mass of a helium atom is 20 grams."  If that trick actually worked in real life, you would be able to know the true mass of a helium atom just by believing some circular logic which asserted it.  Which would enable you to arrive at a true map of the universe sitting in your living room with the blinds drawn.  Which would violate the second law of thermodynamics by generating information from nowhere.  Which would not be a plausible story about how your mind could end up believing something true.

Experimental data and observational data are necessary for the construction of an actual map. You can't make an accurate map of a city you've never been in from inside a locked room with nothing but a sheet of paper. How else would you do it that wasn't just pulling the information out of thin air and stating it to be correct? If not by experiential or observational evidence, if not attached to something, then your belief is floating, not connected to anything but itself and other beliefs, without changing your anticipated experiences. How does your anticipated experience change as a result of a certain belief, and if it doesn't, then what purpose does the belief serve to aid you in navigating the world?

A belief in something like freedom isn't unscientific, a belief in a certain system of ethics isn't necessarily unscientific either. On the contrary science, by telling us more about the world, has a great potential to improve our systems of ethics. We know thanks to science that there's really no difference between races, we know thanks to science that animals aren't so different than us, just as two examples.

I can easily believe in freedom, freedom is a particular idea that is generated in the human mind by a particular arrangement of firing neurons, and it might have slightly different connotations to others. I can even believe that freedom is a good thing based on the knowledge that other people are like me, and I don't like having no choices, so they probably don't like having no choices either.

Science is a tool that is used to increase our understanding of the territory, so that we can have an accurate map by which to navigate. Its clear that having a more accurate map leads to more ways to use the territory as evidenced by our increasingly powerful technology as our map has grown more accurate. Science is the most powerful tool we have, and there is no reason not to apply it to everything we can. There is no special barrier beyond which the scientific method cannot be used. And yes that does end up requiring science to prove itself, but why would you not attempt to discern the truth using the most powerful tool in your arsenal? There's no reason to throw the baby out with the bath water. You can't step outside of yourself so you're always limited to using your own mind.

[Saede Riordan]

well, it's like:

Person A: I think this
Person B: No, that is wrong because Some Dude wrote Some Thing that I'm quoting from.

But what does person B really think, for themselves, about the subject ?

Perhaps because person B feels this thing they're quoting from expresses their thoughts on the matter more eloquently then they would be able to?

I don't see the point in reading what Some Dude thinks about the subject, cos I can do that on Some Dude's website, rather than here.

but whatever.

For the same reason you quote sections of other authors when writing an essay, to pull out parts that are relevant to the specific instance of the discussion you are having or the position you are advocating.

[Nicoletta Mithra]

Hello again, Vikarion.

I am certainly not from the US: I'm from Germany. To me literalism and young-earth creationists are, admittedly, a bunch of far-away guys, which hold weird views on what the bible is talking about. They are, also at odds with christian tradition, which always placed more importance on the spiritual message of the Bible than on it being correct on a literal level.

That said, I'm quite sure that there are Christians in the US aside the literalists and young-earth- creationsists and I personally think it is an overreaction to damn religion in general or Christians in particular for those that depart from tradition and oppose science, when that's not at all necessary.

Also, I don't think that you need to assume interference in the natrual workings of the world, if you believe in a dininity. Nor do I think that 'supernatural experiences' are needed for belief in divinity. I, personally, don't think that one needs 'gaps' in the frame of nature for God to exists. Rather, if someone believes in divinity, I'd rather expect them to not think that the divinity left 'gaps'.

Anyhow, I indeed do claim that religion and science can co-exist. There is no necessary clash between the two. They deal with different aspects of reality: They might overlap here and there to a degree that's smaller or larger, but basically both try to make sense of reality in their own way. Optimally they are complementing each other.

If you're not inclined to religion, though, there's nothing wrong with that, to me.

One last point: While I would agree that one shouldn't put credence to a claim that says that freindship has nothing to do with hormones and such, I would give as little credence, honestly, to someone who tells you that there is no such thing as friendship, but just chemical reactions in the brain. So, for me, this goes both ways, therefore I see no reason to ascribe a 'primacy' to science.