Honestly, when it comes to militarism, I'd say that it draws a lot from the Finnish element of the German-Finnish-Japanese trifecta that CCP's referenced with the Caldari. The Japanese element-- well, to be honest, I don't really see much draw for e-honor so much as zaibatsu, with its focus on loyalty and subservience to company-as-clan-and-family, likely drawing along a Confucian vein of filial piety. The Confucian ideal seems, in my admittedly very limited reading, a hierarchal alternative to the Western democratic ideal of the social contract. This then feeds into rank awareness and social pressure.
But the militarism-- think Finland in the Winter War and the Continuation War. With the Winter War, the anecdote is about Molotov or some other Russian muckity-muck commenting: "We have won just about enough ground to bury our dead." The Finns outfought the Soviets in the winter, and continued to outfight them in the Continuation War, even when grossly outnumbered. Also, drawing on the quote, we should consider the mechanic. Consider that the Finns didn't have much of an indigenous arms industry, and so equipped a tank division using salvaged Russian tanks, often the obsolete tanks they could capture in sufficient quantity to provide spare parts. Even when they got relatively-more-modern German assault guns, they beefed up the armor using logs and concrete blocks. Perhaps, then, we could see this most clearly in Kairiola, which was a water freighter converted into a carrier. If that's not an effective display of make-do, I don't know what is.
On the Prussian front-- well. What's curious, again, is that the one quote referenced the Third Reich instead of just Germans generally. The Prussian military aristocracy, while phenomenally effective and the basis of German military capability with the general staff system and the state's reservist system, was evidently distrusted by Hitler as a conservative element. There was a strong element of competition in Hitler's staff, which I've read explained as a belief that competition for resources would allow the strongest and most effective to rise to the top-- though I'm sure Speer would disagree, seeing as he had to reorganize the German arms industry in the face of constant competition for resources, duplication of effort, etc.
Gaven, on the Napoleonic system. Interestingly, the Israeli reservist model is in the tradition of the Prussian reservist system, which arose from armistice constraints on the size of the Prussian military during the early stage of the Napoleonic wars. To allow for the ability to rapidly draw up trained military forces in the case of another war, Prussia instituted a reservist system and mandatory military service to create a large pool of trained personnel that could be rapidly mobilized in time of war. This system was copied by basically every major power once the Prussians demonstrated its effectiveness, and was one reason why mobilization timetables became a major strategic consideration for European powers in the lead-up to World War 1.
p.s. so, random aside: I keep referencing that one quote from CCP's creative director. While it's only one or two sentences, it has a remarkable meme density, and I get the feeling that it's the sort of thing that exists within CCP as a shorthand, distilled over time to get core concepts across.