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[Saede Riordan]

I'm largely in agreement with everything that Vikarion has said, and anything I could write out would basically be poor paraphrasing of anything he said.

[Nicoletta Mithra]

Most people nowadays have little understanding for non-materialistic, non-utilitaristic moral theories. It's my opinion that this doesn't make materialist Utilitarism right.

[Vikarion]

That answer isn't any more rational at all. Why should people be more productive? Why should they be less likely to take things from you by force? Why should you be better off? How does being more productive make you 'better' off?

Well, let's see. People being more productive makes me happier because people being more productive means that we all have more stuff. Stuff being food, water, houses, and computer games, among other things. Having more stuff makes me happy, or, at least, happier than I was in those parts of my life when I had less stuff. The wealthier and healthier I am, the happier I have tended to be. Do I like being happy? Well, it beats the hell out of being miserable.

Will people take things from me by force if they are happier? Well, not on the average. Forcible acquisition tends to carry certain risks - i.e., I shoot you in the face. This risk of face-shoot-iness is also the reason that I do not take other's stuff, to wit, if I lived close to you and you were to announce tomorrow that you would neither call the police nor initiate any negative action against people acquiring your stuff, you may rest assured that, if I believed you, I would be in possession of much more stuff very soon.   

Thus, the threat of violence deters looting, robbery, and desperate taking. But, if people are poor and starving enough, eventually even a threat of violence against them will not suffice to protect possessions. And this is presuming that one is in the privileged position - if one does not know all future societal positions of oneself with an element of certainty, then it makes sense to ensure that any particular station one could fall to will not be overly uncomfortable.

Also, you can't remove all positive things from the action of feeding the hungry if it is, in itself, a good thing. That would mean to remove the action from itself. There is a good or benefit that is intrinsic to the action itself, that consists in doing it rather than not doing it.

You seem to presume that one should acquire some gratification from doing things that benefit others. But where is one to get this pleasure from, this happiness, if not from positive effects for oneself from an action? At least for me, there is no intrinsic emotional or other reward provided for simply making sure someone doesn't starve. Whether someone starves or not means nothing unless it has a bearing on me.

Now, perhaps you are arguing that humans should program themselves mentally until they perceive such acts as pleasurable or happiness-inducing. I tried to do this, when I was a Christian, and I must admit that, if anything, I came to resent even more the imposition of arbitrary-seeming decisions about what actions were moral and which were not. Loving my enemies, for example, is, according to the New Testament, an intrinsically good act, commanded by God/Jesus. However, I find that I am distinctly averse to carrying out this command. I will not get in trouble if I don't do it, and it won't benefit me if I do do it. The only reason I might get in trouble is if there really were a God who wanted me to do it, a proposition rather countered by the fact that that is possible trouble later, while loving my enemies would require a great deal of inconvenience right now.

All of my attempts to understand the reason for loving my enemies, or to find some happiness in doing so, were unsuccessful. I had a few enemies, including a family member who was abusive, and I can safely say that loving your enemies will not make you happier in a situation like that. Or, at least it certainly didn't make me happier. My second approach, namely getting the rest of my family to abandon and shun that person, was much more successful, and has made me much happier, both in the feeling of personal power it brought me, and the fact that none of us have to deal with her shit anymore.

What do I mean by all this? It is, essentially, an attempt by me to argue against a concept I do not even understand - the idea that a certain action is good in and of itself. Against this, I must mostly argue personal example: specifically, I have no reason to suspect that any action, even saving a child's life (what if the child were, say, Hitler?), is intrinsically good, or that performing such actions will bring me happiness strictly by performing them.

P.S.: Also, you again make your happiness dependant on others. While it might be generally true that foodstamps reduce the risk to get gutted over food, who is to say that some junky won't rip your guts out for a few bucks, leaving you as someone not able to work, to produce anything, bound to the bed and the machine that keeps you breathing or something like that. In one stroke all your 'happiness' and 'benefits' are for nothing. Just because of bad luck. Not a very comforting thought. Such happiness is a very fickle thing. A happiness that is not dependant on luck and circumstance is surely better than one that is.

Well, by this standard, everyone's happiness is dependent on others. I mean, I can assure you that, no matter how internal your happiness is, there are things which can be done to you which will make you unhappy. Indeed, if we are worried about chance and happenstance, there are quite a few things that the natural world can do to make our lives extremely unpleasant. We can strive to minimize that, but there's always a chance for things to go wrong.

And, even given what you've said, I don't think that your ideal is any better off. If you achieve happiness by doing intrinsically good things (whatever that means, I still can't comprehend it), you still have to have the capacity to do them, and people to do them to/for. You still need farmers if you are going to feed the hungry, for example. So how is your intrinsic action not predicated on the actions of others as well?

[Vikarion]

I'm largely in agreement with everything that Vikarion has said, and anything I could write out would basically be poor paraphrasing of anything he said.

Thanks! 

[Nicoletta Mithra]

Well, why should you have more stuff? Why should you be happier than without that stuff? Why should you like being happy? Why should you be happy rather than miserable?

What you say, basically is that you are a-moral. Well, okay, if you think that you are 'better off' if you are amoral in your behaviour, that's your thing. It doesn't devalue the moral life, though. Nor is the point that you don't understand the value of moral life an argument against it. It just means that, apparently, you can't look past your immediate emotional gratification.

And of course what I consider to be good in doing and to bring happiness is better off: First, the good deeds one has done remain as being done, while the gratification of stuff is lost with the stuff. You always can do what is the right thing in your situation. If there are no foodstuffs to feed the poor, then this is of course not something you can do, so you don't have to try it. But you might be able to start farming as well (a good idea anyway if there's no food around) or you might give them an open ear, relieving their misery by listening. Even if you're bound to the bed and can't leave it, you can spare a good word for those visiting you, express your thanks to the ones caring for you. Of course it's even better to live in a functioning society that allows for a wider range of good actions, but that's the subject of political theory, not moral theory. It's not a question of what the single person should do, but how we should organize our society.

The problem here is that you only accept as happiness (immediate) emotional gratification. One can't argue against that. The best thing one can do is to make the appeal that there are other forms of happiness - but if you insist on your position that simply means that you're not really open to debate.

I accept emotional gratification as a form of happiness, but an inferior form - one that should indeed be cultivated to be had on the right occasions. But that's not because you should do these actions out of the emotional gratification. You should do so because otherwise you'd have to act against your emotional predisposition again and again. The value of the right actions isn't in the emotional gratification they might get you. It is indeed not an emotional value at all.

You noticed that I "seem to be arguing that we should do good because it is good to do good. This seems to me like a tautology". It's not. The good thing is by defintion the thing that we should do. The category of the normative seems to be something you don't accept, really. You think in deterministic chains that end with your emotional gratification. This isn't normative at all.

Of course there is a certain rationality to it: A rationality of intermediate goals, aiming at sating your hunger for pleasure. It leaves you as a slave to your lower instincts and urges, using your rationality as a tool for these.

I prefer to that to set ultimate goals, ones that have been set by the human ability to reason, and to use rationality as a tool for achieving these. Likewise I aim at forming my emotional responses in a way that allow me to use them as tools to do what is reasonable.

In your case Aristotle might be right that there are humans that are slaves by nature, posessing enough reason to follow it, but not enough to use it - and thus being in need of outside forces to make them not steal from their neighbours. Or, to use a modern term, you might simply be a sociopath.
 

[Lyn Farel]

What Nico said. I am a fervent partisan of rationalism, and that's not the rationalism I support, far from it. That sounds more like selfish pragmatism or realpolitik to me.

__________________

Also, back to Syria, apparently France is still ready and good to go. They just announced recently that their secret services too have proofs of chemical use and stuff, etc etc. They also said that they eventually are waiting for the US to take a decision since they don't think to be able to go alone.

At the Assembly level, there will of course be a debate, but a vote of the National Assembly is not required to war dec people it seems, though they eventually have to go through that after 4 months engaged in war to ensure that it is worth pursuing or not. A lot of political parties are asking for a vote, though, and while the socialist majority seems to be confident to make one pass (and yet refuse to organize one, saying that they do not have to do it so they won't), politics seem divided on the matter and 65% of the public opinion is against that war (including all the more left wing parties, communists, etc).

To their defense though, they are explicitly refusing any vote of the Assembly on the matter since it would validate the war and since nobody knows if the US are going to do the same or not, winning a vote would mean to go, US intervention or no. That precise part of the constitution to let the executive power all the power to decide without any vote required has its pros, and its cons, and I think that we are seeing right now what the cons are.

They also stated that they do not want to take any sides, and are just going to retaliate against chemical weapon uses. The goal would be to eventually deter anyone in the region to do the same in the future.

Not sure what to think of that, but still quite reticent myself.

[Vikarion]

It is quite possible that I am a sociopath. It is also possible that I am not. I certainly do not feel any sort of connection to much human suffering other than my own, and I find it nearly impossible to put myself into the shoes of others. Nonetheless, that does not make me wrong, or utilitarianism wrong. Actually, I think that my mental outlook makes me better suited to impersonal, rational judgments. (To the mods, I'm not offended by Nico's label of me, I think it might indeed be relevant to the discussion.)

For the sake of argument, let's say that I am, indeed, a sociopath. Now, I will qualify this with an admission that I have generally avoided doing anything that will get me tossed into prison. The most I typically indulge in is a bit of speeding now and then. 

That said, I must confess that I feel I am being given an exceedingly large and easily hit target when I am asked why we should prefer happiness to misery. It is, I think, relatively self-evident that most, perhaps all, human beings prefer to be happy. I certainly do, although I am not particularly upset if you choose misery. Moreover, since misery typically has life-averse antecedents or consequences, being miserable is probably going to result in you not having any say at all fairly quickly. For example, there are few methods better for ensuring one's own misery than setting oneself on fire, but this also tends to ensure that one will soon not be much of anything. So, if nothing else, a preference for at least some happiness and well-being seems to be required for a voice in the conversation, as it were.

That said, I think that asking whether we want to be happy, or possess well-being, is to essentially hit philosophical bedrock. I think a lot can be gained from asking whether a person could even logically desire to exist in the worst possible world (if they do, then a desire is being satisfied, therefore not the WPW), and then going from there to pointing out that, therefore, moving away from the worst possible world is a good thing. But if one is determined to deny that humans really do, fundamentally, want to be happy rather than miserable, and that this is essentially an axiomatic, existence-preferring state of being, I'm not sure that I can help you. I can merely point out that, if one truly wishes to experience non-well-being, they aren't really going to be a concern for longer than it takes them to find a means of self-destruction.

And, I must ask, where are you getting your preferences from, sir? You defend your ethics with an appeal to some higher happiness/well-being. Fine, fine, but if you are going to ask why I should prefer happiness, you are not excluded from the question. If misery is such a viable option, why should we not abandon all happiness, eh? Glass houses and stones, I think. But I digress. The point is that, in all decisions we make, we assume some happiness to be gained, some well-being to be achieved - unless you are willing to assert that a system of ethics which makes everyone worse off is still to be followed as a "good" thing.

- - -

Alright. So much for my defense of happiness. Now, what seems to be advocated is either some sort of odd deontology, or virtue ethics. I have a few criticisms of both.

1.
First, in regards to virtue ethics, I think a fairly cogent criticism of the system is that there is no objective basis for assuming virtues to be virtues. Sure, you might claim that a just, honest, and honorable man is virtuous, but I can simply deny this, and claim that ruthlessness, power, and charisma are more important. If you appeal to the effects these various traits have, then you are appealing, essentially, to utilitarian consequentialism, and I win, because you've just used my ethics to underpin yours. If you appeal to the happiness that certain traits bring about, I can simply point out that if such traits do bring about more happiness, then utilitarian consequentialism incorporates them into the "greatest happiness for the greatest number". After all, if I were passing up sources of happiness, I wouldn't be very utilitarian now, would I?

Second, if there exists people like me, who do not even grasp this "higher happiness" that you speak of, then it is interesting to note that you ascribe to a theory of morality that actually does proclaim that some are born better than others. Not just that some are made more capable, but that some are, in fact, made to be moral superiors of others. But if this is true, if morality is the result of in-born traits, then it is not exactly a choice or personal development, is it? It's merely different programming. In which case, your claim to a morality I cannot grasp is more a claim of your preferences being superior to mine. Do you say that your preferences are better because of how they make you feel, or how they work out for others? Aha! Utilitarian consequentialism again!

2.
And then, to deontology. Well, I think the most cogent argument against deontology is, essentially, the old childish retort of "says who?". More precisely, you can claim that I have a moral duty to do X, but you can't make me agree. I may believe instead in moral duty Y, or in no moral duties at all (as in my personal case). Can you show me to be wrong? Without appealing to the consequences of such behavior (i.e., happiness)?

Another criticism I have is, for example, the trolley problem. It is as follows:

1. Suppose there is a runaway trolley heading down the track, with five people standing on the track. You have a lever near you which you can use to switch the trolley onto an empty siding. Should you push it?

This seems reasonably obvious. Pull the level, get called a hero, whatever. You save five lives, although I would generally be of the opinion that whoever mindlessly stands on a train track may deserve just what he gets. For the purposes of this exercise, however, I'll assume that they had a reason to be there. On to problem 2...

2. As in the above, except that, on the siding, there is another man working on the tracks. If you switch the trolley, he will be killed instead of the five. Do you still pull the lever?

Most people do. After all, you aren't directly killing the man, he's just there. It's unfortunate, but you save five. This might cause problems, however, if one has a moral duty to protect others. Either way, in this case, someone is going to die. In other words, you will be evil no matter what you do, unless your deontology has some clever loopholes for consequences...

3. Instead of a lever and siding, you are standing next to a fat man, wearing some fairly tough clothing. There are still five people further down the track. If you push the fat man in front of the trolley, he will stop the trolley and save the five. He is also the only way to stop the trolley in time. Do you push the fat man?

One can substitute the above problem with another, even more extreme one - supposing that torturing one man to death would save a million? My initial response, in these cases, is simply to assume that, yes, pushing the fat man or torturing the innocent one are indeed justified. The death of five is, weighed in the balance, worse than the death of one, everything else being equal. If one has a moral duty not to kill or torture, however, one is stuck watching five people get run down by a trolley...unless one appeals to the, heh, consequences.

And even if one asserts that one should not push the fat man or torture the innocent man, it must be asked: of what use are morals which leave us dead? Why not simply go ahead and ignore moral duties when not profitable? Yes, we might be somewhat more miserable, but more of us will be alive, too, as opposed to dead, in which case one doesn't get to perform moral duties anyway.

In other words, I think that deontological ethics have no firm metaphysical grounds - there doesn't seem to be a reason to suppose that metaphysical moral imperatives or duties exist, unless these can be evidenced, which so far has not been done. And second, strict adherence to these moral duties would result in worse outcomes for many than would otherwise occur, or, to put it otherwise, even if deontology is true, why not just be "evil" and save more lives in such cases as the trolley problem?

[Nicoletta Mithra]

I'm not a modern thinker in regards to ethics. Actually, I'm not a modern thinker in most regards, being an Aristotelian. I think that Aristotelian ethics is the best ethical framework we have up to date.

Yes, it has some weak points: But that is as well true for utilitarists, deontologists and modern virtue ethics. That I value these weak points versus those benefits in such a way that I prefer Aristotelian ethics is certainly to some degree personal preference.

There is no clear cut argument that rules one of the ethical systems out as being the best.

You said, though, that you aren't an utilitarist ('cause you don't follow the maxim of 'least pain for most people). Your  position is an amoral position, at least in how you described your praxis.

Also, I don't deny that happiness is the goal humans strive for: I merely state that emotional gratification isn't the type of happiness that should be persued in itself (emotional reactions are there to guide us to another good). True happiness consist in action in accordance with reason, having discerned ends in themselves to pursue.

Actually, I think that even though I think that utilitarians got it the wrong way, they do a lot better than amoral beings, because they strive to be moral.

All that said, I personally think that all humans are born with the ability to use reason. It's a potential of all humans. Alas, I think that infact how we are raised does make a difference and that there are different degrees of how easily we can realize our potential to be reasonable beings. Sociopaths are oftentimes quite rational and rarely break the law, just because they fear the consequences rather than for any moral or ethical considerations.

All I can really do is to suggest you read the Nicomachean Ethics (they are available for free in okay-ish translations on the I-net). Aristotle gives a convincing argument there, even though it's not compelling. If it's not for you, then that's it, really.

In the end you will have to decide if you want to put your emotional gratification at the top of your priorities or activity in accordance with reason.

[Vikarion]

Why do you think that Aristotelian ethics are the best we have to date?

I'll try to be more precisely clear - besides the fact that I cannot comprehend your reasons for acting in certain ways, I am also at a loss as to how you are choosing this ethical system. According to what criteria do you say that it is objectively better?

In terms of consequential utilitarianism, I can give the fact that it seems most completely without logical contradictions, most easily based on scientific evidence, and a fairly useful guide to certain actions.

You state that emotional reactions are there to guide us to another good. Which good is this, and why do you call it better than an emotional reaction? What criteria are you using to call it better? These aren't rhetorical questions, I truly am curious.

How do you know what ends are objectively better to pursue? Or do you not hold with objective moral/ethical goals?

You say that I am amoral. Well, if by amoral, you mean "self-interested", then, yes. I do not believe I have ever committed one truly altruistic act in my life, and I feel no poorer for it. That's not to say I never do anything "nice" - I like to get people to like me, among other things. When I was a Christian, I did nice things because I did not want to be punished with hell. I was under the impression that this was true of most people, but it seems that I may have been somewhat mistaken. 

Yet, I am not certain that that makes me immoral. Given what I know of game theory, consequentialism, and economics, it benefits me to exist as a largely benign or even benevolent presence in the lives of others. Yes, I could steal, cheat, and murder, but do that enough and you'll either get caught, killed, or you'll destroy the society you live in. I don't particularly like any of those options. So, am I immoral or amoral because I see things as applying to my benefit? I don't think so.

It seems to me that the idea of the virtuous man, in essence, would give those who believed it the moral sanction to harm me, and others, simply because they had not been fortunate enough to decide to pursue the 'higher' virtues of the virtuous man. And how do we know that such men are virtuous? Why, because they are the virtuous men!

So I am slightly suspicious. 

[Repentence Tyrathlion]

Hardcore moral philosophy - not something I expected on here.  This is why you guys are awesome

On-topic, the Brits have reaffirmed that they're not going to touch military action with a barge pole, regardless of any other evidence or decisions by other countries.  The deputy PM's comment was that there was no point asking parliament the same question over and over.

Now, to the other debate: I must confess that my A-level course in philosophy left me a little disillusioned in moral philosophy, as nothing I'd read seemed to offer satisfactory answers.  The closest that I found were Kantian deontological ethics, if only because they offered some kind of hardcore logical premise - but even that was let down by wishy-washiness and a degree of vagueness.

In my opinion, Virtue ethics - while a laudable theory - is dangerously subjective while assuming its own objectivity.  This thread is a pretty good demonstration of the variety of cultures, opinions and mindsets in the world, and we represent a tiny fraction of what exists - and perhaps more importantly, what has ever existed.  Give that theory to different people, in different places and different times in history, and you would not get the same conclusions from them.  There might be a few similarities, but they would by no means identical.  If this is an acceptable result, great, but what have we really learned from that?  Not that the other two big theories are any better - both utilitarianism and deontology are open to vast amounts of abuse, and the only way that those have been fixed is by literally breaking their own logic.

My personal approach to life has thus become one based on the idea of necessity - specifically, cause no unnecessary harm.  No universalisation, no grand theories of right and wrong.

With all that said, I'm not sure I'd call Vikarion a sociopath - or at least, no more so than western capitalist society tries to make all of us.  He's exemplifying the selfish consumerist mentality that capitalism inherently encourages; the idea that stuff is important.  It's something that we all subscribe to to some extent.  And although an extreme, he has a point - all humanity is essentially selfish.  I would argue that even Nico's position represents self-interest; the difference being that it is a form of enlightened self-interest centred around improvement of society to be more hospitable to oneself.  Do unto others as you would have them do unto you and all that.

[Nicoletta Mithra]

First thing: amoral isn't the same as immoral. Someone who is amoral simply doesn't care for morality, his actions might seem one way or the other, but because he's not in the state of mind that allows him to choose properly between actions, he lacks in the capacity that would make his actions truely immoral or moral, because that would mean that he chooses his actions for their moral value - or in the case of immoral action depite their moral value.

Let me put it this way: You are apparently unable to enjoy happiness that isn't emotional gratification. If hapiness is what you strive for, it will be better to be able to enjoy more rather than less types of happiness. The steady type of happiness will be better than the unsteady and the happiness that is greater better than the one that is smaller.

Consequential utilitarism, by the way, is filled with logical contradictions, isn't really easy to base on scientific evidence (ought-is-problem) and whether it is a useful guide to certain actions depends entirely on what you mean by 'useful' and 'certain'. Anyway, I reiterate myself: You're not an utilitarist, because the maxim of your action isn't the biggest possible pleasure for the biggest possible number of people, but your maxim is - as far as you've said so far - your own pleasure.

I don't see any sense in arguing against a moral theory, if you really argue for amorality. The point is that you might think your position is rational. That's not true though. You certainly try to realize your maxim by rational means, but that doen't mean that your maxim is rational and even much less resonable.

As I said: I prefer to set a reasonable maxim and follow it by rational means, rather than having an irrational, base instict and urges driven and founded maxim, which I follow in a rational way.

So, how do I know what ends are better to pursue? Well, rather by activity of my ability to reason than the 'self-evidence' of emotional gratification.

If you think that an ethical system gives anyone the sanction to harm you based on a vicious circle, then you really don't understand how ethics work. There are certainly such types of problems with some moral systems - the amoral person isn't better off there, though. In the case of the jew's in the third reich for example, you'd have been not only getting away with snooping out a jew and taking his stuff, you would have furthermore enjoyed the accolades of doing so. Given your maxim of maximizing your own pleasure you might have very well ended up as a reknowned jew-hunter.

The amoral person is always only as good as the judicial system and the system of social penalizing based on the morals of the society, keeping them in check. (Which means immoral persons and criminals are usually worse people.) The moral person is as good as the moral system she follows. The ethical person can and tries to be better than that.

[Nicoletta Mithra]

In my opinion, Virtue ethics - while a laudable theory - is dangerously subjective while assuming its own objectivity.  This thread is a pretty good demonstration of the variety of cultures, opinions and mindsets in the world, and we represent a tiny fraction of what exists - and perhaps more importantly, what has ever existed.  Give that theory to different people, in different places and different times in history, and you would not get the same conclusions from them.  There might be a few similarities, but they would by no means identical.  If this is an acceptable result, great, but what have we really learned from that?  Not that the other two big theories are any better - both utilitarianism and deontology are open to vast amounts of abuse, and the only way that those have been fixed is by literally breaking their own logic.

If we forsook all things that are open to abuse, then we would stand there quite empty handed. And actually, I think it is a strength of virtue ethics that it is sensitive to context. A good ethical theory should be able to get into a meaningful relation with the people applying it. Furthermore I am of the opinion that what is good for one culture doesn't need to be good for another. As example: It's good for Mike Tyson to drink and eat as he does. For John Smith sitting all day at his PC doing paperwork, it'd prolly be the wrong diet.

My personal approach to life has thus become one based on the idea of necessity - specifically, cause no unnecessary harm.  No universalisation, no grand theories of right and wrong.

How is 'cause no unnecessary harm' not a universalisation? And how is it not open to misuse? One can easily justify all kinds of things by citing that it is necessary harm. And while I agree that it's no grand theory of right and wrong, it still seems to be a theory of right and wrong.

With all that said, I'm not sure I'd call Vikarion a sociopath - or at least, no more so than western capitalist society tries to make all of us.  He's exemplifying the selfish consumerist mentality that capitalism inherently encourages; the idea that stuff is important.  It's something that we all subscribe to to some extent.  And although an extreme, he has a point - all humanity is essentially selfish.

That all humanity is essentially selfish is a steep hypothesis, one that is hard to validate, to not speak of proof. What makes him sociopathic is the total lack of empathy and, apparently, behavioral control if not stimulated to do so by social levers.

I would argue that even Nico's position represents self-interest; the difference being that it is a form of enlightened self-interest centred around improvement of society to be more hospitable to oneself.  Do unto others as you would have them do unto you and all that.

There's nothing wrong with self-interest, but with making self-interest the be-all end-all. My position doesn't essentially rest on reciprocal gratification. Of course it is better if you get rewarded directly or indirectly for the right action, than if there's no reward, but my position is that the right action is rewarding in itself, even if there is neither a direct or indirect reward by the external world.

[Anslol]

http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html?hpt=hp_t1

Sure, NOW he agrees.

[Pieter Tuulinen]

This stuff is the stuff we know how to do. We'll lose some planes, we'll expend some ordnance and we'll strip off a good percentage of Assad's arsenal of expensive toys.

Yes that includes the Russian air defence system. If you think the Air Force hasn't been drooling at the chance to percussively test it, you don't understand how the Air Force thinks.

I don't think it'll go too far, because I'm not sure WE want the rebels to win any more than Assad does. Another version of Iran is hardly better for us - on the other hand Syria has crossed more than a few lines and it sounds like America and France are up for paying the tab.

[Vikarion]

It feels to me like they are gallivanting off to be big proud heroes, when we need the money, and we would actually benefit if Assad killed a lot more. Or vice-versa, since it seems to be nasty versus nasty over there.

Oh well, maybe it will turn out ok, but I doubt it. It seems to me like they are rolling in the fire ant nest naked after shampooing with honey, but hey, not like I can stop it.