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Kiaor was a notable Minmatar historical figure attributed with saying, "Those whom you hate so fervently, you must have once loved so deeply."

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Author Topic: Substitution  (Read 5197 times)

Shintoko Akahoshi

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Re: Substitution
« Reply #45 on: 09 May 2013, 17:57 »

Oh, and here's two last little thoughts to keep you awake at night: the human brain appears to be completely mechanistic, which means that there is almost certainly no soul to lose. If scientists place monitors on a subject's brain in the lab, they find that people actually make a decision to do something well before the person in question actually believes they have made a decision.

I've never liked this line of reasoning. Is there some reason why you believe that "you" don't include all the bits that churn away below the level of consciousness? Haven't you ever had the experience of thinking about a problem for a long time without being able to solve it, going to sleep, and finding that you've gotten some new insight overnight that leads you to the solution? There's a lot of stuff that goes on down there below your conscious mind, but that doesn't mean that it's not part of you. I'm not chiming in on one side or the other in the "soul?" argument, but I am saying that "decisions seem to be made before we are consciously aware of making them" doesn't imply either "the human brain appears to be completely mechanistic" or "there is almost certainly no soul".

Davlos

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Re: Substitution
« Reply #46 on: 09 May 2013, 21:02 »

What Vikaron mentioned was the computational theory of mind, and I don't disagree with it. In fact, I agree with it 100%. What we are and what our minds are, are determined by the physical state of our brains and what they're doing right now. If there is truly a soul, my soul would have overcome the physical fuckup that caused me to have Asperger's Syndrome and be a walking social wreck IRL - the only thing keeping me from failing to integrate myself into wider human society is my training of my own mind to deal with and calculate human and social relations via a mathematical process more than using my own feelings.

We happen to have "free will", or pretend that we have free will because we have a prefrontal cortex. That's it.
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Vikarion

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Re: Substitution
« Reply #47 on: 09 May 2013, 21:12 »

I've never liked this line of reasoning. Is there some reason why you believe that "you" don't include all the bits that churn away below the level of consciousness? Haven't you ever had the experience of thinking about a problem for a long time without being able to solve it, going to sleep, and finding that you've gotten some new insight overnight that leads you to the solution? There's a lot of stuff that goes on down there below your conscious mind, but that doesn't mean that it's not part of you. I'm not chiming in on one side or the other in the "soul?" argument, but I am saying that "decisions seem to be made before we are consciously aware of making them" doesn't imply either "the human brain appears to be completely mechanistic" or "there is almost certainly no soul".

Actually, my argument in no way discounts the subconscious. My point is that free will, defined as an ability to make choices independent of the mechanical effects of the human body, does not appear to exist. To put it another way, when you choose to do something, you choose to do it because certain neurons in your brain fire, and those neurons fire as a result of environment and genetics. There is no separate self directing the brain to make choices - you are your brain, and your brain is a very complex biological computer.

And this helps explain the problem with the idea of a soul, as well. If you damage part of a brain, you will lose access to the functions that part directs. Lose certain parts, and you lose motor skills, memories, or abilities. Damage other parts, and you might have trouble with breathing, heartbeat, or paralysis. Damage enough of it, and you will cease functioning. If there is a soul, it seems very strange that the brain appears to encapsulate all that we are.

This would seem to make it somewhat self-evident that your thoughts, desires, and decisions are no more directed by "you" than your heartbeat, or your subconscious reactions. You have no choice but to think the thoughts you are thinking. What other thoughts could you think? If one really examines one's own thoughts and consciousness, one will find them, I think, rather ephemeral.

This doesn't take away anything from the wonders, pains, and joys of life, I think. But what it does do, as I imagine it, is reveal the silliness of thinking that we are static entities, or even continuous ones. Consider the following problem, if you will: suppose that, every night, every atom in your body was replaced by a (as atoms tend to be) completely similar atom, operating the same way. Would you still be the same person? And this happens, more or less, every ten years. Suppose that, one night, instead of replacing every atom, whatever process did this accidentally replaced you twice, creating two of you? It seems that both would have every right to consider themselves to be "you".

What if, every night before you were replaced, you lost your memory of the previous ten minutes? Would you still be yourself? Do you, even now, remember or store every ten or twenty minutes of your day? I doubt that you could tell me exactly what you did for a full day one year ago today.

What if your brain ceased conscious functioning for ten minutes before you were replaced, and then operated normally after the procedure? Why would this make any difference? If it does, then are those people who have been "dead" for ten or twenty minutes (as a result of extreme cold in drowning situations) different people? It is theoretically possible that we may some day find a way to put someone in thermal or temporal stasis. Since those people are not consciously functioning, indeed, are for all purposes "dead", does that mean that they are no longer themselves? Obviously not, I should think.

Thus, it would seem to be that one is not what one is composed of, or the form in which one exists (we do not consider pacemakers, implanted electronics, or other mechanical replacements/augmentations to be a threat to self-hood) that defines who one is. Nor does it seem to be whether we maintain continual conscious function, so long as we can resume it. This leads me to conclude that it does not matter if I continue in this exact same body, or am revived one thousand years from now, in regards to whether I exist. It is whether my memories, drives, thoughts, emotions, and all the other various bits of information go on, that defines whether I continue to exist. And that seems to me to be true whether I am flesh or machine, original or clone.
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Vikarion

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Re: Substitution
« Reply #48 on: 09 May 2013, 21:22 »

We happen to have "free will", or pretend that we have free will because we have a prefrontal cortex. That's it.

Thanks, Davlos. However, one thing which I would note in my own experience is that I've had a very hard time with free will for a long time. When I was a Christian, I was a calvinist, which is a fancy way of saying that I applied to a doctrine which did not necessarily allow for free will. This caused me to think about it a lot.

To use Sam Harris's thought on the matter, it seems to me that the illusion of free will is an illusion itself. If I examine my thoughts and emotions, it is obvious to me that all of my decisions and choices, thoughts and abilities, are built on prior experiences, desires, and predispositions. I don't ever do anything I don't want to do. For example, I don't typically like sushi. I could decide to eat it anyway, but my overruling of the "sushi is yucky" desire will be a result of some other desire (for example, "salmon sushi is ok", or, "I should really give this a fair try, because I might learn to really like it"). Those desires, however, are themselves caused by other things, or appear to arise without my conscious decision to have them arise.

To put it in another way, my desires and decisions cannot be lifted out of the context of my brain, and I don't experience anything that would lead me to feel that they are. Now, please excuse me, I am going to go get my tea out of the microwave, because my brain is giving me the desire to, based on a mechanical analysis of the water levels in my cells.
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Shintoko Akahoshi

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Re: Substitution
« Reply #49 on: 10 May 2013, 11:49 »

Actually, my argument in no way discounts the subconscious. My point is that free will, defined as an ability to make choices independent of the mechanical effects of the human body, does not appear to exist.

Oh, I'm not actually disagreeing with that. It sounded like you were trying to argue that, since decisions appear to stem from the subconscious mind, that they don't comprise free will.

Like you, I'm a refugee from a religion that has thought long and hard about free will. In my opinion (and I'll freely admit that we can't really go beyond opinions and beliefs in this issue), if a decision I make cannot be predicted, then that's evidence that I have free will. Mathematically, you could say that anything non-deterministic is evidence of free will - though that's a weird acid trip into the land of Leibnitz's monadology and some of the more recent Rudy Rucker stories. There's enough non-deterministic processes in the universe that the idea of a completely "mechanistic" brain doesn't discount the idea of free will.

Iwan Terpalen

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Re: Substitution
« Reply #50 on: 10 May 2013, 13:22 »

There is no practical difference between non-deterministic and deterministic but sufficiently sensitive so as to be unpredictable. In any case, how does randomness save "naive" free will, beyond proposing some kind of nous nudging the dice and heading straight back into supernaturalism?
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